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Abstract—We investigate the secure connectivity of wire-
less sensor networks under the random key distribution
scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor. Unlike recent work
which was carried out under the assumption of full
visibility, here we assume a (simplified) communication
model where unreliable wireless links are represented as
on/off channels. We present conditions on how to scale the
model parameters so that the network i) has no secure node
which is isolated and ii) is securely connected, both with
high probability when the number of sensor nodes becomes
large. The results are given in the form of full zero-one
laws, and constitute the first complete analysis of the EG
scheme under non-full visibility. Through simulations these
zero-one laws are shown to be valid also under a more
realistic communication model, i.e., the disk model. The
relations to the Gupta and Kumar’s conjecture on the
connectivity of geometric random graphs with randomly
deleted edges are also discussed.
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks, Security, Key predis-
tribution, Random graphs, Connectivity.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Wireless sensor networks and security
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are distributed collections
of sensors that are envisioned [1] to be used in a wide
range of application areas including healthcare (e.g. patient
monitoring), military operations (e.g., battlefield surveillance)
and homes (e.g., home automation and monitoring). These
WSNs will often be deployed in hostile environments where
communications can be monitored, and nodes are subject to
capture and surreptitious use by an adversary. Under such
circumstances, cryptographic protection will be needed to en-
sure secure communications, and to support functions such as
sensor-capture detection, key revocation and sensor disabling.
Unfortunately, many security schemes developed for general
network environments do not take into account the unique
features of WSNs: Public key cryptography is not computa-
tionally feasible because of the severe limitations imposed on
the physical memory and power consumption of the individual
sensors. Traditional key exchange and distribution protocols
are also not useful as they are based on trusting third parties
while the topologies of large-scale WSNs are unknown prior
to deployment. We refer the reader to the papers [6], [11], [18],
[19] for more detailed discussions on the security challenges
in WSN settings.
Random key predistribution schemes were recently intro-
duced to address some of these difficulties. The idea of
randomly assigning secure keys to sensor nodes prior to
network deployment was first introduced by Eschenauer and
Gligor [11]. According to their scheme, here after referred to
as the EG scheme, each sensor is independently assigned K
distinct cryptographic keys which are selected uniformly at
random from a pool of P keys. These K keys constitute the
key ring of the node and are inserted into its memory before
the network deployment. Two sensor nodes can then establish
a secure link between them if they are within transmission
range of each other and if their key rings have at least one
key in common; see [11] for implementation details.
Since then, many competing alternatives to the EG scheme
have been proposed; see [6] for a detailed survey of vari-
ous key distribution schemes for WSNs. With a number of
schemes available, a basic question arises as to how they
compare with each other. Answering this question requires
a good understanding of the properties and performance of
the schemes under consideration, and there are a number of
ways to achieve this. The approach we use here considers
random graph models naturally induced by a given scheme,
and then develops the scaling laws corresponding to desirable
network properties, e.g., absence of secure nodes which are
isolated, secure connectivity, etc. This is done with the aim of
deriving guidelines to dimension the scheme, namely adjust its
parameters so that these properties occur with high probability
as the number of nodes becomes large. Here, we focus on
the connectivity properties since secure connectivity is one of
the basic properties required for a successful operation of the
WSN.
B. Relevant work
To date, much efforts along the above lines have been
carried out under the assumption of full visibility according
to which sensor nodes are all within communication range of
each other. Under this assumption, the EG scheme gives rise
to a class of random graphs known as random key graphs;
relevant results are available in the references [3], [9], [11],
2[16], [20]. The q-composite scheme [7], a simple variation of
the EG scheme, was investigated by Bloznelis et al. [4] through
an appropriate extension of the random key graph model.
Recently, Yag˘an and Makowski have analyzed various random
graphs induced by the random pairwise key predistribution
scheme of Chan et al. [7]; see [21].
To be sure, the full visibility assumption does away with
the wireless nature of the communication medium supporting
WSNs. In fact, a common criticism of the above line of
work is that by disregarding the unreliability of the wireless
links, the resulting dimensioning guidelines are likely to be
too optimistic: In practice nodes will have fewer neighbors
since some of the communication links may be impaired. As a
result, the desired connectivity properties may not be achieved
if dimensioning is done according to results derived under full
visibility.
With this in mind, there has been a number of efforts to
incorporate a wireless communication model to the existing
full visibility models of the key distribution schemes. Among
them, the most popular one is the so called disk model [12]:
Assuming that the sensors are distributed over a bounded
region D of a euclidian plane, two nodes are assumed to have
a direct communication link in between as long as they are
within transmission range of each other. In other words, with
ρ > 0 denoting the transmission range, nodes i and j located
at xi and xj are able to communicate if
‖ xi − xj ‖< ρ. (1)
When the node locations are independently and uniformly
distributed over the region D, the graph induced under the
condition (1) is known as a random geometric graph [12],
[17] for which the most well-known result is the following
zero-one law for connectivity [12]: If D is a disk of unit area,
ρ is scaled with the number of nodes n, and it holds that
πρ2n =
logn+ wn
n
,
then the probability that the resulting geometric random
graph is connected tends to 1 (resp. 0) as n gets large if
limn→∞ wn = ∞ (resp. limn→∞ wn = −∞). It was also
conjectured by Gupta and Kumar [12] that if each edge of the
geometric random graph was to be deleted with probability
1 − α independently from all the other edges, then the zero-
one law for connectivity would take the following form: If α
and ρ are scaled with n and it holds that
πρ2nαn =
logn+ wn
n
, (2)
then the resulting random graph, which is an intersection
of the random geometric graph and the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph
[5]), is connected with probability tending to 1 (resp. 0) if
limn→∞ wn =∞ (resp. limn→∞ wn = −∞).
Inspired by these, the studies on the secure connectivity of
WSNs have focused [14], [23] on establishing an appropriate
analog of the conjecture (2). After all, incorporating the disk
model to the EG scheme corresponds to studying a random
graph formed by intersecting the geometric random graph with
the random key graph. As a result, one can conjecture that,
with β denoting the probability that two nodes have at least
one common key in the EG scheme, and
πρ2nβn =
log n+ wn
n
, (3)
we have connectivity with probability tending to 1 (resp. 0) as
n gets large if limn→∞ wn =∞ (resp. limn→∞ wn = −∞).
To date, both of the conjectures (2) and (3) remain to
be open. In fact, despite several attempts, even the less
stronger forms of the conjectures have not been established
yet. Namely, the conjectures (2) and (3) imply that with
πρ2nαn = c
logn
n
(4)
πρ2nβn = c
logn
n
, (5)
respectively, the resulting graphs are connected with probabil-
ity tending to 1 (resp. 0) if c > 1 (resp. c < 1).
For instance, Di Pietro et al. [8] have
shown that under the scaling (5), the one law
limn→∞ P [Corresponding random graph is connected] = 1
follows if ρn > 0 and c > 20π. Very recently, Krzywdzin´ski
and Rybarczyk [14] have improved this results and established
the one-law under (5) for c > 8 without any constraint on ρn.
In [14], the authors have also established the one-law under
(4) for c > 8 marking the first connectivity result for the
random geometric graph with random edge deletion. Another
notable work is due by Yi et al. [23], where the authors have
established the strong forms (2) and (3) of the conjectures
but only for the property of absence of isolated nodes;
there, it was also assumed that limn→∞ αn logn = ∞ and
limn→∞ βn log n = ∞. Clearly, absence of isolated nodes is
a necessary condition for connectivity but it is not a sufficient
one. Hence, for the connectivity property, the results in [23]
imply only the zero-laws under the scalings (2) and (3) (and
hence under (4) and (5)), leaving the conjectured one-laws
under the scalings (2) and (3) open. The less stronger forms
of the conjectured zero-one laws are also open as there exists
no results for the connectivity of the resulting graphs when
1 < c ≤ 8 under the scalings (4) and (5).
C. Contributions
In this paper, we do not attempt to establish either one of
the conjectures (4) and (5). Yet, we still would like to establish
a precise characterization of the connectivity properties of the
EG scheme without the full visibility assumption. With this
aim, we study the connectivity properties of the EG scheme
under a simple communication model where channels are
mutually independent, and are either on or off. This amounts
to an overall system model constructed by intersecting the
random key graph with an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graph [5].
For this random graph structure, we establish zero-one laws
for two basic (and related) graph properties, namely graph
connectivity and the absence of isolated nodes, as the model
parameters are scaled with the number of users – We identify
the critical thresholds and show that they coincide. Namely,
3with the notation introduced so far, we show that if α and β
are scaled with the number of nodes n and it holds that
αnβn = c
logn
n
(6)
then, the resulting random graph is connected (and has no
isolated nodes) with probability approaching to 1 (resp. 0) if
c > 1 (resp. c < 1); see Section III for precise statements of
the results. To the best of our knowledge, these full zero-one
laws constitute the first complete analysis of the EG scheme
under non-full visibility.
Although the communication model considered here may be
deemed simplistic, it does permit a complete analysis of the
issues of interest with the results providing a precise guideline
for ensuring the secure connectivity of a WSN. Obtaining
such precise guidelines by means of determining the exact
threshold of secure connectivity is particularly crucial in a
WSN setting due to a number of reasons: First, to increase
the chances of connectivity, it is often required to increase the
number of keys kept in each sensor’s memory. However, since
sensor nodes are expected to have very limited memory, it is
desirable for practical key distribution schemes to have low
memory requirements [10]. Second, in the EG scheme, there
is a well known [9] trade-off between security and connectivity
meaning that the more connected is the network the less secure
it is. These point out the importance of the full zero-one laws
established here in dimensioning the EG scheme as compared
to the existing results [8], [14], where there is a significant
gap between the conditions of the zero-law (c < 1) and the
one-law (c > 8).
Finally, simulations suggest that the connectivity behavior
of the EG scheme under the on/off channel model is asymp-
totically equivalent to that of the EG scheme under the disk
model. This suggests that the zero-one laws obtained here can
be taken as an indication of the validity of the conjectured
zero-one law under the scaling (5).
D. Notation and convention
A word on notation and conventions in use: All limiting
statements, including asymptotic equivalences, are understood
with the number of sensor nodes n going to infinity. The
random variables (rvs) under consideration are all defined on
the same probability triple (Ω,F ,P). Probabilistic statements
are made with respect to this probability measure P, and we
denote the corresponding expectation operator by E. Also, we
use the notation =st to indicate distributional equality. The
indicator function of an event E is denoted by 1 [E]. We say
that an even holds with high probability (whp) if it holds with
probability 1 as n→∞. For any discrete set S we write |S|
for its cardinality.
E. Structure of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we give precise definitions and implementation details of
the EG scheme along with a description of the model of
interest. The main results of the paper, namely Theorem 3.1
and Theorem 3.2, are presented in Section III with an extensive
simulation results given in Section IV. The remaining sections,
namely Sections V through XIV, are devoted to establishing
the main results of the paper.
II. THE MODEL
Under full visibility, the random key distribution scheme of
Eschenauer and Gligor gives rise to a class of random graphs
usually known as random key graphs [20]; some authors [3],
[16] refer to them as uniform random intersection graphs.
Random key graphs are parametrized by the number n of
nodes, the size P of the key pool and the size K of each
key ring with K ≤ P . To lighten the notation we often group
the integers P and K into the ordered pair θ ≡ (K,P ).
For each node i = 1, . . . , n, let Ki(θ) denote the random
set of K distinct keys assigned to node i. We can think of
Ki(θ) as an PK-valued rv where PK denotes the collection
of all subsets of {1, . . . , P} which contain exactly K elements
– Obviously, we have |PK | =
(
P
K
)
. The rvs K1(θ), . . . ,Kn(θ)
are assumed to be i.i.d. rvs, each of which is uniformly
distributed over PK with
P [Ki(θ) = S] =
(
P
K
)−1
, S ∈ PK (7)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. This corresponds to selecting keys
randomly and without replacement from the key pool.
Distinct nodes i, j = 1, . . . , n are said to be K-adjacent,
written i ∼K j, if they share at least one key in their key
rings, namely
i ∼K j iff Ki(θ) ∩Kj(θ) 6= ∅. (8)
For distinct i, j = 1, . . . , n, it is a simple matter to check that
P [Ki(θ) ∩Kj(θ) = ∅] = q(θ) (9)
with
q(θ) =


0 if P < 2K
(P−KK )
(PK)
if 2K ≤ P ,
(10)
whence the probability of edge occurrence between any two
nodes is equal to 1 − q(θ). The expression (10) and others
given later are simple consequences of the often used fact that
P [S ∩Ki(θ) = ∅] =
(
P−|S|
K
)
(
P
K
) , i = 1, . . . , n (11)
for every subset S of {1, . . . , P} with |S| ≤ P −K .
With n = 2, 3, . . . and positive integers K < P , the
adjacency notion (8) defines the random key graph K(n; θ)
on the vertex set {1, . . . , n}.
As mentioned earlier, in this paper we seek to account
for the possibility that communication links between nodes
may not be available. To study such situations, we assume a
communication model that consists of independent channels
each of which can be either on or off. Thus, with α in (0, 1),
let {Bij(α), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} denote i.i.d. {0, 1}-valued rvs
with success probability α. The channel between nodes i and
4j is available (resp. up) with probability α and unavailable
(resp. down) with the complementary probability 1− α.
Distinct nodes i and j are said to be B-adjacent, written
i ∼B j, if Bij(α) = 1. The notion of B-adjacency defines
the standard Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph G(n;α) on the vertex set
{1, . . . , n}. Obviously,
P [i ∼ j]B = α.
The random graph model studied here is obtained by
intersecting the random key graph K(n; θ) with the ER graph
G(n;α). More precisely, the distinct nodes i and j are said
to be adjacent, written i ∼ j, if and only if they are both
K-adjacent and B-adjacent, namely
i ∼ j iff
Ki(θ) ∩Kj(θ) 6= ∅
and
Bij(α) = 1.
(12)
The resulting undirected random graph defined on the vertex
set {1, . . . , n} through this notion of adjacency is denoted
K ∩G(n; θ, α).
Throughout the collections of rvs {K1(θ), . . . ,Kn(θ)} and
{Bij(α), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} are assumed to be independent, in
which case the edge occurrence probability in K ∩G(n; θ, α)
is given by
P [i ∼ j] = α · P [i ∼K j] = α(1 − q(θ)). (13)
III. MAIN RESULTS
To fix the terminology, we refer to any mapping K,P :
N0 → N0 as a scaling (for random key graphs) provided it
satisfies the natural conditions
Kn ≤ Pn, n = 1, 2, . . . . (14)
Similarly, any mapping α : N0 → (0, 1) defines a scaling for
ER graphs. Finally, a scaling K,P : N0 → N0 is said to be
admissible if
2 ≤ Kn (15)
for all n = 1, 2, . . . sufficiently large.
To lighten the notation we often group the parameters K , P
and α into the ordered triple Θ ≡ (K,P, α) = (θ, α). Hence, a
mapping Θ : N0 → N0 ×N0 × (0, 1) defines a scaling for the
intersection graph K ∩G(n; Θ) provided the condition (14)
holds.
A. Absence of isolated nodes
The first result gives a zero-one law for the absence of
isolated nodes.
Theorem 3.1: Consider an admissible scaling K,P : N0 →
N0 and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) such that
αn(1 − q(θn)) ∼ c logn
n
, n = 1, 2, . . . (16)
for some c > 0. If limn→∞ αn logn = α⋆ exists, then we have
lim
n→∞
P
[
K ∩G(n; Θn) contains
no isolated nodes
]
=


0 if c < 1
1 if c > 1.
(17)
The condition (16) on the scalings will often be used in the
equivalent form
αn(1 − q(θn)) = cn logn
n
, n = 1, 2, . . . (18)
with the sequence c : N0 → R+ satisfying limn→∞ cn = c.
The assumption that limn→∞ αn logn = α⋆ exists is made
due to technical reasons and it is much weaker than the
condition limn→∞ αn logn =∞ assumed in [23].
B. Connectivity
An analog of Theorem 3.1 also holds for the property of
graph connectivity.
Theorem 3.2: Consider an admissible scaling K,P : N0 →
N0 and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (16) holds for some
c > 0. If limn→∞ αn logn = α⋆ exists then we have
lim
n→∞
P [K ∩G(n; Θn) is connected] = 0 if c < 1 (19)
On the other hand, if there exists some σ > 0 such that
σn ≤ Pn (20)
for all n = 1, 2, . . . sufficiently large, then we have
lim
n→∞
P [K ∩G(n; Θn) is connected] = 1 if c > 1. (21)
Comparing Theorem 3.2 with Theorem 3.1, we see that
the class of random graphs studied here provides one more
instance where the zero-one laws for absence of isolated
nodes and connectivity coincide, viz. ER graphs [5], random
geometric graphs [17] or random key graphs [3], [16], [20].
The condition (20) states that the size of the key pool Pn
should grow at least linearly with the number of sensor nodes
in the network. Although this condition is enforced merely
for technical reasons, it is not at all a stringent constraint in
a realistic WSN scenario. In fact, it holds trivially for any
realization as it is expected [8], [11] that the size of the key
pool will be much larger than the number of participating
nodes for security purposes.
Theorem 3.2 cannot hold if the condition (15) fails. This
is a simple consequence of the fact that if Kn = 1 for all
n sufficiently large, than the random key graph K(n; θ) is
disconnected with high probability unless it also holds that
Pn = 1 for all n sufficiently large; see [22, Lemma 7.1.2, pp.
99].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results and simulations that show
the validity of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2.
In all experiments, we fix the number of nodes at n = 500
and the size of the key pool at P = 10, 000. We consider
the channel parameters α = 0.2, α = 0.4, α = 0.6 and
α = 0.8, while varying the parameter K from 1 to 35. For each
parameter pair (K,α), we generate 200 independent samples
of the graph K∩G(n;K,P, α) and count the number of times
(out of a possible 200) that the obtained graphs i) have no
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Fig. 1. Empirical probability that K ∩ G(n;K,P,α) is connected as
a function of K for α = 0.2, α = 0.4, α = 0.6, α = 0.8 with
n = 500 and P = 10, 000; in each case, the empirical probability value
is obtained by averaging over 200 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand
for the critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.2. It is clear
that the theoretical findings are in perfect agreement with the experimental
observations.
isolated nodes and ii) are connected. Dividing the counts by
200, we obtain the (empirical) probabilities for the events
of interest. In all cases, we observe that K ∩ G(n;K,P, α)
is connected whenever it has no isolated nodes yielding the
same empirical probability for both events. This confirms
the asymptotic equivalence of the connectivity and absence
of isolated nodes properties in K ∩ G(n; Θ) as stated in
Proposition 7.1.
In Figure 1, we depict the resulting empirical probability
of connectivity in K ∩ G(n;K,P, α) versus K for several
α values. For a better visualization of the data, we use the
curve fitting tool of MATLAB. For each α value, we show
the critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 3.2
by a vertical dashed line. Namely, the vertical dashed lines
stand for the minimum integer value of K that satisfies
1− q(θ) = 1−
(
P−K
K
)
(
P
K
) > 1
α
logn
n
. (22)
Even with n = 500, the threshold behavior of the probability
of connectivity is evident from the plots. Of course, as n gets
large, we expect the curves to look more like a shifted unit step
function with a jump discontinuity (i.e., a threshold) at around
the K value that gives P [Connectivity] = 12 in the current
plots. Thus, for each value of α, we see that the connectivity
threshold prescribed by (22) is in perfect agreement with the
experimentally observed threshold of connectivity.
One possible extension of the work presented here would
be to consider a more realistic communication model; e.g., the
popular disk model [12] instead of the on/off channel model.
As discussed in the Introduction, the disk model induces
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Fig. 2. Empirical probability that K ∩ H(n;K,P, ρ) is connected as
a function of K . The number of nodes is set to n = 500 and we
take P = 10, 000. The resemblance of the plots to those of Figure 1
suggests that the connectivity behaviors of the models K ∩G(n;K,P,α) and
K ∩ H(n;K,P, ρ) are quite similar under the matching condition piρ2 = α.
random geometric graphs [17] denoted by H(n; ρ), where n is
the number of nodes and ρ is the transmission range. Under the
disk model, studying the EG scheme amounts to analyzing the
intersection of K(n; θ) and H(n; ρ), say K ∩H(n;K,P, ρ). To
compare the connectivity behavior of the EG scheme under the
disk model with that of the on-off channel model, consider
200 nodes distributed uniformly and independently over a
folded unit square [0, 1]2 with toroidal (continuous) boundary
conditions. Since there are no border effects, it is easy to check
that
P [ ‖ xi − xj ‖< ρ ] = πρ2, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
whenever ρ < 0.5. Thus, we can match the two communi-
cation models G(n;α) and H(n; ρ) by requiring πρ2 = α.
Using the same procedure that produced Figure 1, we obtain
the empirical probability that K ∩H(n;K,P, ρ) is connected
versus K for various ρ values. The results are depicted in
Figure 2 whose resemblance with Figure 1 suggests that
the connectivity behaviors of the models K ∩G(n;K,P, α)
and K ∩H(n;K,P, ρ) are quite similar under the matching
condition πρ2 = α. This raises the possibility that the results
obtained here for the on/off communication model can be
taken as an indication of the validity of the conjectured zero-
one law by Gupta and Kumar [12] given under the scaling
(4).
V. PRELIMINARIES
Before we give a proof of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2,
we give some preliminary results that will help establish them.
The following inequality will prove useful in a number of
places.
6Lemma 5.1: For any θ = (K,P ) with positive integersK,P
and any scalar a ≥ 1, we have(
P−⌈aK⌉
K
)
(
P
K
) ≤ q(θ)a (23)
Proof. Observe that under the enforced assumptions it always
holds that q(θ) ≥ 0, so that (23) holds trivially if K+⌈aK⌉ >
P . On the other hand, if K + ⌈aK⌉ ≤ P , we can use the
relation [22, Lemma 5.4.1, pp. 79](
P−L
K
)
(
P
K
) = K−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− L
P − ℓ
)
valid for any L such that L+K ≤ P . Substituting we find(
P−⌈aK⌉
K
)
(
P
K
) = K−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− ⌈aK⌉
P − ℓ
)
≤
K−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− aK
P − ℓ
)
(24)
and
q(θ) =
K−1∏
ℓ=0
(
1− K
P − ℓ
)
(25)
In view of (24) and (25), the desired inequality (23) will
follow if we show that
1− aK
P − ℓ ≤
(
1− K
P − ℓ
)a
, ℓ = 0, 1, . . . ,K − 1 (26)
For each ℓ = 0, 1, . . . ,K − 1, this is immediate once we note
that
1−
(
1− K
P − ℓ
)a
=
∫ 1
1− K
P−ℓ
ata−1dt ≤ aK
P − ℓ
by a crude bounding argument and (23) follows.
We also find it useful to make use of the next result:
Lemma 5.2: Consider θ = (K,P ) with positive integers
K,P such that K ≤ 2P . For any 0 < λ < 1, we have
1− q(θ)λ ≥ λ(1− q(θ)) (27)
Proof.
Since λ < 1, we have
1− q(θ)λ =
∫ 1
q(θ)
λtλ−1dt ≥
∫ 1
q(θ)
λdt = λ(1− q(θ)).
In the proof of Theorem 3.2, we will make use of a result
that is a direct consequence of the condition (20).
Lemma 5.3: Consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 ×N0× (0, 1)
such that (16) holds for some c > 0 and (20) holds for some
σ > 0. Then, for any δ > 0, there exists a finite integer n⋆ =
n⋆(δ) such that for all n ≥ n⋆ sufficiently large, we have
Kn ≥
√
(1− δ)σc logn (28)
for all n ≥ n⋆ sufficiently large.
Proof. Under the enforced assumptions it can be seen [22,
Lemma 7.4.3, pp. 118] from (25) that
1− q(θn) ≤ K
2
n
Pn −Kn . (29)
Multiplying the above inequality by αn and using the scaling
condition (16), we find
cn
log n
n
≤ αnK
2
n
Pn
1
1− Kn
Pn
,
or equivalently
αn
K2n
Pn
≥ cn logn
n
(
1− Kn
Pn
)
where the sequence c : N0 → R+ satisfies limn→∞ cn = c.
Invoking (20), we get
K2n ≥
1
αn
cnσ logn
(
1− Kn
Pn
)
≥ cnσ logn
(
1− Kn
σn
)
upon using the fact that αn ≤ 1 for each n = 1, 2, . . . . This
is equivalent to having
K2n +Kn
cn logn
n
≥ cnσ logn
which yields
K2n(1 + o(1)) ≥ cnσ logn
The desired conclusion (28) is now immediate.
VI. A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
We prove Theorem 3.1 by the method of first and second
moments [13, p. 55] applied to the total number of isolated
nodes in K ∩G(n; Θ). First some notation: Fix n = 2, 3, . . .
and consider Θ = (K,P, α) with α in (0, 1) and positive
integers K,P such that K ≤ P . With
χn,i(Θ) := 1 [Node i is isolated in K ∩G(n; Θ)]
for each i = 1, . . . , n, the number of isolated nodes in
K ∩G(n; Θ) is simply given by
In(Θ) :=
n∑
i=1
χn,i(Θ).
The random graph K ∩G(n; Θ) has no isolated nodes if and
only if In(Θ) = 0.
The method of first moment [13, Eqn (3.10), p. 55] relies
on the well-known bound
1− E [In(Θ)] ≤ P [In(Θ) = 0] (30)
7while the method of second moment [13, Remark 3.1, p. 55]
has its starting point in the inequality
P [In(Θ) = 0] ≤ 1− E [In(Θ)]
2
E [In(Θ)2]
. (31)
The rvs χn,1(Θ), . . . , χn,n(Θ) being exchangeable, we find
E [In(Θ)] = nE [χn,1(Θ)] (32)
and
E
[
In(Θ)
2
]
= nE [χn,1(Θ)] + n(n− 1)E [χn,1(Θ)χn,2(Θ)]
by the binary nature of the rvs involved. It then follows that
E
[
In(Θ)
2
]
E [In(Θ)]
2 =
1
nE [χn,1(Θ)]
+
n− 1
n
· E [χn,1(Θ)χn,2(Θ)]
(E [χn,1(Θ)])
2 . (33)
From (30) and (32) we see that the one-law
limn→∞ P [In(Θn) = 0] = 1 will be established if we
show that
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,1(Θn)] = 0. (34)
It is also plain from (31) and (33) that the zero-law
limn→∞ P [In(Θn) = 0] = 0 holds if
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,1(Θn)] =∞ (35)
and
lim sup
n→∞
(
E [χn,1(Θn)χn,2(Θn)]
(E [χn,1(Θn)])
2
)
≤ 1. (36)
The proof of Theorem 3.1 passes through the next two
technical propositions which establish (34), (35) and (36)
under the appropriate conditions on the scaling Θ : N0 →
N0 × N0 × (0, 1).
Proposition 6.1: Consider a scaling K,P : N0 → N0 and a
scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (16) holds for some c > 0.
Then, we have
lim
n→∞
nE [χn,1(Θn)] =


0 if c > 1
∞ if c < 1
(37)
A proof of Proposition 6.1 is given in Section VI-A.
Proposition 6.2: Consider an admissible scaling K,P :
N0 → N0 and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) such that (16) holds
for some c > 0. If limn→∞ αn logn = α⋆ exists, then we have
(36) whenever c < 1.
A proof of Proposition 6.2 can be found in Section VI-B.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1, pick a scaling
Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 × (0, 1) such that (16) holds for
some c > 0 and limn→∞ αn = α⋆ exists. Under the
condition c > 1 we get (34) from Proposition 6.1, and
the one-law limn→∞ P [In(Θn) = 0] = 1 follows. Next,
assume that c < 1. We obtain (35) and (36) with the help
of Propositions 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. The conclusion
limn→∞ P [In(Θn) = 0] = 0 follows and Theorem 3.1 is
now established.
A. A proof of Proposition 6.1
In the course of proving Proposition 6.1 we make use of
the decomposition
log(1− x) = −x−Ψ(x), 0 ≤ x < 1 (38)
with
Ψ(x) :=
∫ x
0
t
1− tdt
on that range. Note that
lim
x↓0
Ψ(x)
x2
=
1
2
.
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider Θ = (K,P, α) with α in
(0, 1) and positive integers K,P such that K ≤ P . It is easy
to see that χn,1(Θ) = 1, meaning that node 1 is isolated, if
and only if
B1j(α) = 0 ∨ K1(θ) ∩Kj(θ) = ∅, j = 2, . . . , n.
Conditioning on K1(θ), we get by independence that
E [χn,1(Θ)] = (1− α(1 − q(θ)))n−1 . (39)
Now consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 × (0, 1) such
that (16) holds for some c > 0 and replace Θ by Θn in (39)
according to this scaling. Using decomposition (38) we get
nE [χn,1(Θn)] = e
βn (40)
with
βn (41)
= logn− (n− 1) (αn(1 − q(θn) + ψ (αn(1 − q(θn))))
= logn− (n− 1)
(
cn
logn
n
+ ψ
(
cn
logn
n
))
= logn
(
1− cnn− 1
n
)
− (n− 1)
(
cn
logn
n
)2 ψ (cn lognn )(
cn
logn
n
)2
where the sequence c : N0 → R+ satisfies limn→∞ cn =
c. Let n go to infinity in this last expression and recall the
behavior of Ψ(x) at x = 0 mentioned earlier. We have
lim
n→∞
(n− 1)
(
cn
log n
n
)2 ψ (cn lognn )(
cn
logn
n
)2 = 0.
Noting also that
lim
n→∞
(
1− cnn− 1
n
)
= 1− c,
we get limn→∞ βn = ∞ (resp. −∞) whenever c < 1 (resp.
c > 1). The desired condition (37) is now immediate via (40).
8B. A proof of Proposition 6.2
As expected, the first step in proving Proposition 6.2 con-
sists in evaluating the cross moment appearing in the numer-
ator of (36). Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider Θ = (K,P, α)
with α in (0, 1) and positive integers K,P such that K ≤ P .
Define the {0, 1}-valued rv u(θ) by
u(θ) := 1 [K1(θ) ∩K2(θ) 6= ∅] . (42)
Next, with r = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 define vr,j(α) by
vr,j(α) := {i = 1, 2, . . . , r : Bij(α) = 1} (43)
for each j = r + 1, . . . , n. In other words, vr,j(α) is the
set of nodes in 1, . . . , r that have an edge with the node j in
the communication graph G(n;α). Conditioning in K1(θ) and
K2(θ), it is now a simple matter to check that
E [χn,1(Θ)χn,2(Θ)] = E

(1− α)u(θ) n∏
j=3
(P−|∪i∈v2,jKi(θ)|
K
)
(
P
K
)


In order to efficiently bound this term, we first observe that
under the event u(θ) = 0 (which happens with probability
q(θ)), we have
| ∪i∈v2,j(α) Ki(θ)| = |v2,j(α)|K, j = 3, . . . , n
and it is plain by direct inspection and (23) that(
P−|v2,j(α)|K
K
)
(
P
K
) ≤ q(θ)|v2,j(α)|
As a result, we find
E

(1− α)u(θ) n∏
j=3
(P−|∪i∈v2,j(α)Ki(θ)|
K
)
(
P
K
)
∣∣∣∣∣ u(θ) = 0


≤ E

 n∏
j=3
q(θ)|v2,j(α)|


= E
[
q(θ)|v2,3(α)|
]n−2
=
(
2∑
i=0
(
2
i
)
αi(1− α)2−iq(θ)i
)n−2
= (1− α(1 − q(θ)))2(n−2) (44)
as we note that {|vr,j(α)|}nj=r+1 are i.i.d. random variables
with
|vr,j(α)| =st Bin(r, α), j = r + 1, . . . , n.
On the other hand if u(θ) = 1 (which happens with
probability 1− q(θ)) we get
| ∪i∈v2,j(α) Ki(θ)| (45)
=


0 if |v2,j(α)| = 0
K if |v2,j(α)| = 1
2K − |K1(θ) ∩K2(θ)| if |v2,j(α)| = 2
for each j = 3, . . . , n. Therefore, crude bounding argument
gives
| ∪i∈v2,j(α) Ki(θ)| ≥ K1 [|v2,j(α)| > 0]
yielding (P−|∪i∈v2,j(α)Ki(θ)|
K
)
(
P
K
) ≤ q(θ)1[|v2,j(α)|>0]
With these in mind we obtain
E

(1− α)u(θ) n∏
j=3
(P−|∪i∈v2,j(α)Ki(θ)|
K
)
(
P
K
)
∣∣∣∣∣ u(θ) = 1


≤ (1− α)E

 n∏
j=3
q(θ)1[|v2,j(α)|>0]


= (1− α)E
[
q(θ)1[|v2,3(α)|>0]
]n−2
= (1− α) ((1 − α)2 + (1− (1− α)2) q(θ))n−2
= (1− α)
(
(1− α(1 − q(θ)))2 + α2q(θ)(1 − q(θ))
)n−2
≤
(
(1− α(1 − q(θ)))2 + α2q(θ)(1 − q(θ))
)n−2
(46)
Recalling (39), (44) and (46) we find
E [χn,1(Θ)χn,2(Θ)]
(E [χn,1(Θ)])
2 (47)
≤ q(θ) (1− α(1− q(θ)))
2(n−2)
(1− α(1− q(θ)))2(n−1)
+ (1 − q(θ))×
×
(
(1− α(1− q(θ)))2 + α2q(θ)(1 − q(θ))
)n−2
(1− α(1− q(θ)))2(n−1)
=
q(θ)
(1− α(1− q(θ)))2
+
1− q(θ)
(1− α(1 − q(θ)))2
(
1 +
α2q(θ)(1 − q(θ))
(1− α(1 − q(θ)))2
)n−2
≤
q(θ) + (1− q(θ)) exp{ α2(1−q(θ))n
(1−α(1−q(θ)))2
}
(1− α(1− q(θ)))2
Now consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 × (0, 1) such
that (16) holds for some c < 1 and replace Θ by Θn in (47)
according to this scaling. Invoking (16) it is immediate that
lim
n→∞
(1− αn(1− q(θn)))2 = 1
and the desired condition (36) will follow if we show that
lim sup
n→∞

q(θn) + (1 − q(θn)) exp


αncn logn(
1− cn lognn
)2



 ≤ 1
(48)
with limn→∞ cn = c < 1. As in the statement of Proposition
6.2 assume that limn→∞ αn logn = α⋆ exists. We consider
9the cases α⋆ = 0 and α⋆ ∈ (0,∞] separately. Firstly, if α⋆ = 0
we get
lim
n→∞
exp


αncn logn(
1− cn lognn
)2

 = 1
and (48) readily follows.
Next, assume that α⋆ > 0. Recalling the scaling condition
(16), we write
q(θn) + (1− q(θn)) exp


αncn logn(
1− cn log nn
)2

 (49)
= q(θn) + (1− q(θn))αn logn
exp
{
αncn logn
(1−cn lognn )
2
}
αn logn
= q(θn) + cn logn
2 · n
−1+ αncn
(1−cn lognn )
2
αn logn
≤ q(θn) + cn logn2 · n
−1+ cn
(1−cn lognn )
2
αn logn
upon using the fact that αn ≤ 1 in the last step. Under the
enforced assumptions, we clearly have
lim
n→∞

−1 + cn(
1− cn lognn
)2

 = −1 + c < 0
and we find
lim
n→∞

cn logn2 · n
−1+ cn
(1−cn lognn )
2
αn logn

 = 0
upon recalling the assumption that limn→∞ αn logn =
α⋆ > 0. The desired condition (48) follows as we note that
q(θn) ≤ 1.
VII. A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2 (OUTLINE)
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider Θ = (K,P, α) with α in
(0, 1) and positive integers K,P such that K ≤ P . We define
the events
Cn(Θ) := [K ∩G(n; Θ) is connected]
and
I(n; Θ) := [K ∩G(n; Θ) contains no isolated nodes] .
If the random graph K ∩G(n; Θ) is connected, then it does
not contain any isolated node, whence Cn(Θ) is a subset of
I(n; Θ), and the conclusions
P [Cn(Θ)] ≤ P [I(n; Θ)] (50)
and
P [Cn(Θ)
c] = P [Cn(Θ)
c ∩ I(n; θ)] + P [I(n; Θ)c] (51)
obtain.
Taken together with Theorem 3.1, the relations (50) and
(51) pave the way to proving Theorem 3.2. Indeed, pick a
scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 × (0, 1) such that (16) holds for
some c > 0 and limn→∞ αn logn = α⋆ exists. If c < 1, then
limn→∞ P [I(n; Θn)] = 0 by the zero-law for the absence
of isolated nodes, whence limn→∞ P [Cn(Θn)] = 0 with
the help of (50). If c > 1, then limn→∞ P [I(n; Θn)] = 1
by the one-law for the absence of isolated nodes, and the
desired conclusion limn→∞ P [Cn(Θn)] = 1 (or equivalently,
limn→∞ P [Cn(Θn)
c] = 0) will follow via (51) if we show
the following:
Proposition 7.1: For any scaling Θ : N0 → N0×N0×(0, 1)
such that (16) holds for some c > 1, we have
lim
n→∞
P [Cn(Θn)
c ∩ I(n; Θn)] = 0. (52)
as long as the condition (20) is satisfied.
The basic idea in establishing Proposition 7.1 is to find a
sufficiently tight upper bound on the probability in (52) and
then to show that this bound goes to zero as n becomes large.
This approach is similar to the one used for proving the one-
law for connectivity in ER graphs [5, p. 164].
We begin by finding the needed upper bound: Fix n =
2, 3, . . . and consider Θ = (K,P, α) with α in (0, 1) and
positive integers K,P such that K ≤ P . For the reasons that
will later become apparent we find it useful to introduce the
event En(Xn(θ)) in the following manner:
En(Xn(θ)) =
⋃
S⊆N : |S|≥1
[|∪i∈SKi(θ)| ≤ Xn,|S|(θ)]
(53)
where Xn(θ) = [Xn,1(θ) Xn,2(θ) · · · Xn,n(θ)] is an n-
dimensional integer valued array. Let
rn(θ) := min
(
r(θ),
⌊n
2
⌋)
with r(θ) :=
⌊
P
K
⌋
.
In due course, we always set
Xn,i(θ) =


⌊λKi⌋ i = 1, 2, . . . , rn(θ)
⌊µP ⌋ i = rn(θ) + 1, . . . , n
(54)
for some λ, µ in (0, 12 ) that will be specified later. For
convention, we also take Xn,0 = 0.
By a crude bounding argument we now get
P [Cn(Θ)
c ∩ I(n; Θ)] (55)
≤ P [En(Xn(θ))] + P [Cn(Θ)c ∩ I(n; Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
Hence, a proof of Proposition 7.1 consists of establishing the
following two results.
Proposition 7.2: Consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 ×
(0, 1) such that (16) holds for some c > 1, and (20) is satisfied
for some σ > 0. We have
lim
n→∞
P [En(Xn(θn))] = 0. (56)
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where Xn(θn) = [Xn,1(θn) · · · Xn,n(θn)] is as specified in
(54) with λ in (0, 12 ) is selected small enough to ensure
max
(
2λσ, λ
(
e2
σ
) λ
1−2λ
)
< 1, (57)
and µ in (0, 12 ) is selected so that
max
(
2
(√
µ
(
e
µ
)µ)σ
,
√
µ
(
e
µ
)µ)
< 1. (58)
A proof of Proposition 7.2 can be found in Section VIII.
Note that for any σ > 0, limλ↓0 λ
(
e2
σ
) λ
1−2λ
= 0 so that
the condition (57) can always be met by suitably selecting
λ > 0 small enough. Also, we have limµ↓0
(
e
µ
)µ
= 1, whence
limµ↓0
√
µ
(
e
µ
)µ
= 0, and (58) can be made to hold for any
σ > 0 by taking µ > 0 sufficiently small.
Proposition 7.3: Consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 ×
(0, 1) such that (16) holds for some c > 1, and (20) is satisfied
for some σ > 0. We have
lim
n→∞
P [Cn(Θn)
c ∩ I(n; Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c] = 0. (59)
where Xn(θn) = [Xn,1(θn) · · · Xn,n(θn)] is as specified in
(54) with µ in (0, 12 ) is selected small enough to ensure (58) and
λ ∈ (0, 12 ) is selected such that it satisfies (57).
A proof of Proposition 7.3 is given in Section IX.
VIII. A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.2
The arguments that will lead to (56) are taken mostly from
[22]. First observe by a standard union bound that
P [En(Xn(θ))]
≤
∑
S⊆N :1≤|S|≤n
P
[|∪i∈SKi(θ)| ≤ Xn,|S|(θ)]
=
n∑
r=1

 ∑
S∈Nn,r
P [|∪i∈SKi(θ)| ≤ Xn,r(θ)]


where Nn,r denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , n}
with exactly r elements. By using exchangeability and the fact
that |Nn,r| =
(
n
r
)
, we get
P [En(Xn(θ))] ≤
n∑
r=1
(
n
r
)
P [Ur(θ) ≤ Xn,r(θ)]
=
rn(θ)∑
r=1
(
n
r
)
P [Ur(θ) ≤ ⌊λrK⌋] (60)
+
n∑
r=rn(θ)+1
(
n
r
)
P [Ur(θ) ≤ ⌊µP ⌋]
where Ur(θ) matches the definition given in [20], i.e.,
Ur(θ) = | ∪ri=1 Ki(θ)|.
Now, consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 × (0, 1) such
that (16) holds for some c > 1 and assume that the condition
(20) is satisfied for some σ > 0. Replace θ by θn in (60)
with respect to this scaling. It was shown in [22, Proposition
7.4.14] that for any scaling θ : N0 → N0 such that (20) holds
for some σ > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
n∑
r=rn(θn)+1
(
n
r
)
P [Ur(θn) ≤ ⌊µPn⌋] = 0 (61)
whenever µ in (0, 12 ) is selected so that (58) holds. Hence, the
desired conclusion (56) will follow if we show that
lim
n→∞
rn(θn)∑
r=1
(
n
r
)
P [Ur(θn) ≤ ⌊λrKn⌋] = 0 (62)
under the condition (57). Under the enforced assumptions,
one can easily deduce from [22, Proposition 7.4.13] that for
any λ in (0, 12 ) small enough to ensure (57) we have (62)
and this establishes Proposition 7.2.
IX. A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.3
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and consider Θ = (K,P, α) with α in
(0, 1) and positive integers K,P such that K ≤ P . For any
non-empty subset S of nodes, i.e., S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we define
the graph K ∩G(n; Θ)(S) (with vertex set S) as the subgraph
of K ∩G(n; Θ) restricted to the nodes in S. We also say
that S is isolated in K ∩G(n; Θ) if there are no edges (in
K ∩G(n; Θ)) between the nodes in S and the nodes in the
complement Sc = {1, . . . , n} − S. This is characterized by
Ki(θ) ∩Kj(θ) = ∅ ∨ Bij(α) = 0, i ∈ S, j ∈ Sc.
With each non-empty subset S of nodes, we associate
several events of interest: Let Cn(Θ;S) denote the event that
the subgraph K ∩G(n; Θ)(S) is itself connected. The event
Cn(Θ;S) is completely determined by the rvs {Ki(θ), i ∈ S}
and {Bij(α), i, j ∈ S}. We also introduce the event Bn(Θ;S)
to capture the fact that S is isolated in K ∩G(n; Θ), i.e.,
Bn(Θ;S)
:= [Ki(θ) ∩Kj(θ) = ∅ ∨ Bij(p) = 0, i ∈ S, j ∈ Sc] .
Finally, we set
An(Θ;S) := Cn(Θ;S) ∩Bn(Θ;S).
The starting point of the discussion is the following basic
observation: If K ∩G(n; Θ) is not connected and yet has no
isolated nodes, then there must exist a subset S of nodes with
|S| ≥ 2 such that K ∩G(n; Θ)(S) is connected while S is
isolated in K ∩G(n; Θ). This is captured by the inclusion
Cn(Θ)
c ∩ I(n; Θ) ⊆
⋃
S⊆N : |S|≥2
An(Θ;S) (63)
A moment of reflection should convince the reader that this
union need only be taken over all subsets S of {1, . . . , n} with
2 ≤ |S| ≤ ⌊n2 ⌋.
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By a standard union bound argument, we immediately get
P [Cn(Θ)
c ∩ I(n; Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
≤
∑
S⊆N :2≤|S|≤⌊n2 ⌋
P [An(Θ;S) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
=
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=2

 ∑
S∈Nn,r
P [An(Θ;S) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]

 (64)
where Nn,r denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , n}
with exactly r elements.
For each r = 1, . . . , n, we simplify the notation
by writing An,r(Θ) := An(Θ; {1, . . . , r}), Bn,r(Θ) :=
Bn(Θ; {1, . . . , r}) and Cn,r(Θ) := Cn(Θ; {1, . . . , r}). With
a slight abuse of notation, we use Cn(Θ) for r = n as de-
fined before. Under the enforced assumptions, exchangeability
yields
P [An(Θ;S)] = P [An,r(Θ)] , S ∈ Nn,r
and the expression∑
S∈Nn,r
P [An(Θ;S) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
=
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θ) ∩En(Xn(θ))c] (65)
follows since |Nn,r| =
(
n
r
)
. Substituting into (64) we obtain
the key bound
P [Cn(Θ)
c ∩ I(n; Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c] . (66)
Consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 × (0, 1) as in the
statement of Proposition 7.1. Substitute Θ by Θn by means
of this scaling in the right hand side of (66). The proof of
Proposition 7.1 will be completed once we show
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c] = 0. (67)
The means to do so are provided in the next section.
X. BOUNDING THE PROBABILITIES P [An,r(Θ)]
(r = 1, . . . , n)
Consider α in (0, 1) and positive integers K and P such
that K ≤ P . Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and pick r = 1, . . . , n−1. First,
observe the equivalence
Bn,r(Θ) =
[(∪i∈vr,j(α)Ki(θ)) ∩Kj(θ) = ∅, j = r + 1, . . . n]
where vr,j(α) is as defined in (43). Hence, under the enforced
assumptions on the rvs K1(θ), . . . ,Kn(θ), we readily obtain
the expression
P
[
Bn,r(Θ)
∣∣∣ Ki(θ), i = 1, . . . , r
Bij(α), i = 1, . . . , r, j = r + 1, . . . , n
]
=
n∏
j=r+1
((P−|∪i∈vr,j(α)Ki(θ)|
K
)
(
P
K
)
)
It is clear that the distributional properties of the term
| ∪i∈vr,j(α) Ki(θ)| will play an important role in efficiently
bounding P [Bn,r(Θ)]. Note that it is always the case that
| ∪i∈vr,j(α) Ki(θ)| ≥ K1 [|vr,j(α)| > 0] . (68)
Also, on the event En(Xn(θ))c, we have
| ∪i∈vr,j(α) Ki(θ)| ≥
(
Xn,|vr,j(α)|(θ) + 1
) · 1 [|vr,j(α)| > 0]
(69)
for each j = r + 1, . . . , n. Conditioning on the rvs
K1(θ), . . . ,Kr(θ) and {Bij(α), i, j = 1, . . . , r} (which
determine the event Cr(Θ)), we conclude via (68)-(69) that
P [An,r(Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
= P [Cr(Θ) ∩Bn,r(Θ) ∩En(Xn(θ))c]
≤ E

 1 [Cr(Θ)]×
×∏nj=r+1 (
P−max{K,Xn,|vr,j(α)|
(θ)+1}·1[|vr,j(α)|>0]
K
)
(PK)


Observe that the event Cr(Θ) is independent from the set-
valued random variables vr,j(α) for each j = r + 1, . . . , n.
Also, as noted before {|vr,j(α)|}nj=r+1 are i.i.d.. Invoking
these we obtain
P [An,r(Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
≤ E
[(
P−max{K,Xn,|vr(α)|(θ)+1}1[|vr(α)|>0]
K
)
(
P
K
)
]n−r
× P [Cr(Θ)] (70)
with vr(α) denoting a generic random variable identically
distributed with vr,j(α), j = r + 1, . . . , n, i.e.,
vr(α) =st Bin(r, α). (71)
We now compute the expectation appearing at (70) by using
the definition (54).
Lemma 10.1: Consider θ = (K,P ) with positive integers
K and P such that K ≤ P . With Xn(θ) defined as in (54) for
some λ and µ in (0, 12 ), we have
E
[(
P−max{K,Xn,|vr(α)|(θ)+1}1[|vr(α)|>0]
K
)
(
P
K
)
]
≤ e−α(1−q(θ))λr + e−Kµ1 [r > rn(θ)] (72)
for each r = 1, . . . , ⌊n2 ⌋.
Proof: Fix r = 1, . . . , rn(θ) and recall (23). On that
range, we have
(
X|vr(α)|(θ) + 1
) · 1 [|vr(α)| > 0] ≥ ⌈λ|vr(α)|K⌉.
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Thus, in view of (23), we get
E
[(
P−max{K,Xn,|vr(α)|(θ)+1}1[|vr(α)|>0]
K
)
(
P
K
)
]
≤ E
[(
P−max{⌈λ|vr(α)|K⌉,K1[|vr(α)|>0]}
K
)
(
P
K
)
]
(73)
≤ E
[
q(θ)λ|vr(α)|1[λ|vr(α)|≥1]+1[|vr(α)|>0]1[λ|vr(α)|<1]
]
.
≤ E
[
q(θ)λ|vr(α)|1[λ|vr(α)|≥1]+λ|vr(α)|1[λ|vr(α)|<1]
]
. (74)
= E
[
q(θ)λ|vr(α)|
]
(75)
where in (74) we used the facts that
1 [|vr(α)| > 0]1 [λ|vr(α)| < 1] ≥ λ|vr(α)|1 [λ|vr(α)| < 1]
and q(θ) < 1.
Now, direct computation via (71) yields
E
[
q(θ)λ|vr(α)|
]
=
r∑
j=0
(
r
j
)
αj(1− α)r−jq(θ)λj
=
(
1− α (1− q(θ)λ))r
≤ (1− αλ (1− q(θ)))r (76)
≤ e−α(1−q(θ))λr, (77)
upon using (27) in (76).
On the range r = rn(θ) + 1, . . . , ⌊n2 ⌋, we use(
P−L
K
)
(
P
K
) ≤ e−KP ·L
that holds [22, Lemma 5.4.1, pp. 79] for any positive integer
L. Thus, in view of (75), we have
E
[(
P−max{K,Xn,|vr(α)|(θ)+1}1[|vr(α)|>0]
K
)
(
P
K
)
]
≤ E
[
q(θ)λ|vr(α)|1 [|vr(α)| ≤ rn(θ)]
]
(78)
+ E
[
e−
K
P
·(⌊µP⌋+1)
1 [|vr(α)| > rn(θ)]
]
upon using the fact that
max{K,Xn,|vr(α)|(θ) + 1}1 [|vr(α)| > 0] ≥ ⌊µP ⌋+ 1
whenever |vr(α)| > rn(θ).
In view of (77) and (78), we now obtain
E
[(
P−max{K,Xn,|vr(α)|(θ)+1}1[|vr(α)|>0]
K
)
(
P
K
)
]
≤ e−α(1−q(θ))λr (79)
+
r∑
j=rn(θ)+1
(
r
j
)
αj(1 − α)r−je−KP (⌊µP⌋+1)
≤ e−α(1−q(θ))λr +
r∑
j=0
(
r
j
)
αj(1− α)r−je−µK
≤ e−α(1−q(θ))λr + e−µK
and the desired conclusion (72) follows.
We also find it useful to note the crude bound
P [An,r(Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
≤ P [Cr(Θ)]E
[
q(θ)1[|vr(α)|>0]
]n−r
(80)
immediate by direct inspection from (70) and (73).
The next result shows that for each r = 2. . . . , n, the
probability of the eventCr(Θ) can be provided an upper bound
in terms of known quantities.
Lemma 10.2: For each r = 2, . . . , n, we have
P [Cr(Θ)] ≤ rr−2 (α (1− q(θ)))r−1 . (81)
Proof. First some notation: For each r = 2, . . . , n, let
Kr(n; θ) and Gr(n;α) define the subgraphs K(S) and G(S),
respectively, when S = {1, . . . , r}. Similarly let Kr∩Gr(n; Θ)
stand for the subgraph K ∩ G(S). Finally, let Tr denote the
collection of all spanning trees on the vertex set {1, . . . , r}. It
was shown [22, Lemma 7.4.5, pp. 124] that
P [T ⊂ Kr(n; θ)] = (1− q(θ))r−1 , T ∈ Tr (82)
where the notation T ⊂ Kr(n; θ) indicates that the tree T is
a subgraph spanning Kr(n; θ). It is also well known [5] that
P [T ⊂ Gr(n;α)] = αr−1, T ∈ Tr (83)
By independence we find
P [T ⊂ Kr ∩Gr(n; Θ)] = (α (1− q(θ)))r−1 , T ∈ Tr,
(84)
upon combining (82) and (83).
By Cayley’s formula [15] there are rr−2 trees on r vertices,
i.e., |Tr| = rr−2, and (81) follows (via (84)) upon making
use of a union bound.
XI. ESTABLISHING (67)
It is now clear how to proceed: Consider an admissible
scaling K,P : N0 → N0 and a scaling α : N0 → (0, 1) as in
the statement of Proposition 7.1. For the time being, pick an
integer R ≥ 2 (to be specified in Section XIII), and on the
range n ≥ n⋆(R) consider the decomposition
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c] (85)
=
R∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
+
max{R,rn(θ)}∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
+
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=max{R,rn(θ)}+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c] .
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Let n go to infinity: The desired convergence (67) will be
established if we show
lim
n→∞
R∑
r=2
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c] = 0, (86)
lim
n→∞
max{R,rn(θn)}∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c] = 0
(87)
and
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=max{R,rn(θn)}+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
= 0 .(88)
The next sections are devoted to proving the validity of (86),
(87) and (88) by repeated applications of the inequalities (70)
and Lemmas 10.1-10.2. Throughout, we also make repeated
use of the standard bounds(
n
r
)
≤
(en
r
)r
(89)
valid for all r, n = 1, 2, . . . with r ≤ n. Finally, we note by
convexity that the inequality
(x+ y)p ≤ 2p−1(xp + yp), x, y ≥ 0
p ≥ 1 (90)
holds.
XII. ESTABLISHING (86)
For any arbitrary integer R ≥ 2, it is clear that (86) will
follow upon showing
lim
n→∞
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c] = 0, r = 2, 3, . . .
Fix r = 2, 3, . . . and recall (80), (81) together with (89). We
get(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θ) ∩ En(Xn(θ))c]
≤
(
n
r
)
P [Cr(Θ)]E
[
q(θ)1[|vr(α)|>0]
]n−r
≤
(en
r
)r
rr−2 (α (1− q(θ)))r−1 E
[
q(θ)1[|vr(α)|>0]
]n−r
while we find
E
[
q(θ)1[|vr(α)|>0]
]
= (1− α)r + (1− (1− α)r) q(θ)
≤ 1− α(1− q(θ))
upon using (71) and the fact that q(θ) ≤ 1. This yields(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θ) ∩En(Xn(θ))c]
≤ (en)r (α (1− q(θ)))r−1 (1− α(1 − q(θ)))n−r (91)
Now consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 × (0, 1) such
that (16) holds for some c > 1 and replace Θ by Θn in (91)
according to this scaling. We find(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
≤ (en)r (αn (1− q(θn)))r−1 (1− αn(1− q(θn)))n−r
= (en)r
(
cn
logn
n
)r−1(
1− cn logn
n
)n−r
≤ n (ecn logn)r e−cn lognn−rn
= (ecn logn)
r
n1−cn
n−r
n
with the sequence c : N0 → R+ satisfying limn→∞ cn = c >
1. Now let n grow large in this last inequality. We obtain
lim
n→∞
(
1− cnn− r
n
)
= 1− c < 0
and the desired conclusion (86) follows for any r = 2, 3, . . ..
XIII. ESTABLISHING (87)
Consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0 × N0 × (0, 1) and
positive scalars λ, µ as in the statement of Proposition 7.3.
Since R can be taken to be arbitrarily large by virtue of the
previous section, the desired relation (87) follows immediately
if lim sup rn(θn) <∞. Assume now that lim sup rn(θn) =∞
and on the range r = R+1, . . . , rn(θn), recall (70), (72), and
(81). We get(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c] (92)
≤
(en
r
)r
rr−2 (αn(1 − q(θn)))r−1 e−αn(1−q(θn))rλ(n−r)
=
(en
r
)r
rr−2
(
cn
logn
n
)r−1
e−cn
log n
n
rλ(n−r)
≤ n (ecn logn)r e−cn logn·rλn−rn .
Now, observe that on the range r = R + 1, . . . , rn(θn), we
have r ≤ ⌊n2 ⌋ so that n−rn ≥ 12 . This yields
rn(θn)∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
≤
rn(θn)∑
r=R+1
n
(
ecn logn e
−λ cn2 logn
)r
≤
∞∑
r=R+1
n
(
ecn logn e
−λ cn2 logn
)r
. (93)
Observe that
lim
n→∞
ecn log n e
− cn2 λ log n = 0 (94)
so that the infinite series appearing at (93) is
summable. Indeed, for n sufficiently large to ensure
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that ecn logn e−
cn
2
λ logn < 1, we find
rn(θn)∑
r=R+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
≤ n
(
ecn logn e
− cn2 λ logn
)R+1
1− ecn logn e− cn2 λ logn
=
(ecn log n)
R+1
n1−
cn
2 λ(R+1)
1− ecn logn e− cn2 λ logn,
where the sequence c : N0 → R+ satisfies limn→∞ cn = c.
Now let n go to infinity in this last expression. In view
of (94), we get (87) whenever R is selected large enough to
satisfy
c
2
λ(R + 1) > 1. (95)
Note that we have c > 1 and λ > 0. Thus, (95) can always
be satisfied by selecting
R ≥ 2
λ
(96)
and (87) is now established.
XIV. ESTABLISHING (88)
Consider a scaling Θ : N0 → N0×N0× (0, 1) and positive
scalars λ, µ as in the statement of Proposition 7.3. On the
range r = max{R, rn(θn)} + 1, . . . , ⌊n2 ⌋, recall (70), (72),
and (81). We get
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩En(Xn(θn))c]
≤
(
n
r
)
P [Cr(Θn)]
(
e−αn(1−q(θn))rλ + e−Knµ
)n−r
≤
(
n
r
)
P [Cr(Θn)]
(
e−cn
log n
n
rλ + e−Knµ
)n
2 (97)
where the sequence c : N0 → R+ satisfies limn→∞ cn = c >
1.
We will establish (88) in two steps. First set
rˆn =
⌈
3
λ
n
logn
⌉
.
Obviously, the range r = max{R, rn(θn)} + 1, . . . , ⌊n2 ⌋ is
intersecting the range r = rˆn, . . . , ⌊n2 ⌋. For the latter range,
we invoke (97) to get
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=rˆn
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=rˆn
(
n
r
)(
e−cn
logn
n
rλ + e−Knµ
)n
2
≤
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=rˆn
(
n
r
)(
e−3 + e−Knµ
)n
2
for n sufficiently large since limn→∞ cn = c > 1. Using the
binomial formula
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=rˆn
(
n
r
)
≤ 2n, (98)
this yields
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=rˆn
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
≤ 2n (e−3 + e−Knµ)n2
≤ (2√2)n
(
e−
3
2n + e−
Knµ
2 n
)
upon also invoking (90). Now, let n go to infinity and recall
from (28) that limn→∞Kn =∞. We immediately get
lim
n→∞
⌊n2 ⌋∑
r=rˆn
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c] = 0 (99)
since 2
√
2 · e− 32 < 1.
If rˆn ≤ rn(θn) + 1 for all n sufficiently large, then the
desired condition (88) is automatically satisfied via (99). On
the other hand, if rn(θn) + 1 < rˆn, we should still consider
the range r = max{R, rn(θn)}+1, . . . , rˆn. But, on that range
we have
e−cn
logn
n
rλ + e−µKn
= e−cn
logn
n
rλ
(
1 + e−µKn+cn
logn
n
rλ
)
≤ exp
{
−cn logn
n
rλ + e−µKn+cn
logn
n
rλ
}
= exp
{
−cn logn
n
rλ
(
1− e
−µKn+cn
logn
n
rλ
cn
logn
n
rλ
)}
≤ exp
{
−cn logn
n
rλ
(
1− e
−µKn+3cn
cn
logn
n
rλ
)}
(100)
while it also holds that
e−µKn
cn
log n
n
rλ
≤ e
−µKn
cn
log n
n
Pn
Kn
λ
≤ Kne
−µKn
cnσλ
. (101)
Invoking the consequence (28) yields
lim
n→∞
Kne
−µKn = 0,
whence we get
lim
n→∞
e−µKn+3cn
cn
logn
n
rλ
= 0.
It is now immediate via (100) that for any given ǫ > 0,
there exists a finite integer n⋆ such that if n ≥ n⋆, we have
e−cn
log n
n
rλ + e−µKn ≤ e−cn lognn rλ(1−ǫ).
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Thus, on the range n = n⋆ + 1, . . ., we use (97) to get
rˆn∑
max{R.rn(θn)}+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
≤
rˆn∑
max{R,rn(θn)}+1
(
n
r
)
P [Cr(Θn)] e
−cn
logn
n
rλ(1−ǫ)n2
Arguments leading to (93) gives
rˆn∑
max{R,rn(θn)}+1
(
n
r
)
P [An,r(Θn) ∩ En(Xn(θn))c]
≤
∞∑
r=max{R,rn(θn)}+1
n
(
ecn logn e
−cn
(1−ǫ)
2 λ logn
)r
and via similar arguments it is easy to see that
lim
n→∞
∞∑
r=max{R,rn(θn)}+1
n
(
ecn logn e
−
cn(1−ǫ)
2 λ logn
)r
= 0
as long as
lim inf
n→∞
(1 − ǫ)
2
cλmax{R, rn(θn)} > 1
The above relation can be guaranteed by choosing R such that
R ≥ 2
λ
as in (96). The desired conclusion (88) is now established.
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